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This article is going to look at patching Golang code at the assembly level to modify some behaviour in the net/http standard library. The Golang maintainers aren’t super interested in changing this bit of behavior, so lets fix it ourselves!
Slack integrations such as webhook APIs are often used to alert on user actions to internal teams. A vulnerability was noted when user supplied data containing a large amount of white space was included in a request to the Slack webhook API. By including enough white space in this data, the messages would be split and truncated. As a result, the malicious payload after the whitespace would appear as a standalone message from the Slack bot. An attacker could exploit this to forge messages containing Slack message markup to perform social engineering and other attacks if an integration, such as a website or other software, included unvalidated user input in the message to the Slack webhook.
Configuring USBGuard without explicitly specifying vendor and product IDs allows an attacker to bypass some USB authorisation policies on Linux. A device may claim to belong to one USB class (e.g. say it’s a keyboard), but actually act as a network adapter, mass storage or other more exotic device. The Gnome desktop’s USB protection policies are vulnerable by default.
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